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Abstract A secret sharing scheme (SSS) was introduced by Shamir in 1979
using polynomial interpolation. Later it turned out that it is equivalent to an
SSS based on a Reed-Solomon code. SSSs based on linear codes have been
studied by many researchers. However there is little research on SSSs based
on additive codes. In this paper, we study SSSs based on additive codes over
GF (4) and show that they require at least two steps of calculations to reveal
the secret. We also define minimal access structures of SSSs from additive
codes over GF (4) and describe SSSs using some interesting additive codes
over GF (4) which contain generalized 2-designs.
Keywords access structure · additive codes · generalized t-design · minimal
access structure · secret sharing scheme
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1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme (SSS) is a method of distributing a secret to a finite
set of participants such that only predefined subsets of the participants can
recover the secret. All the participants receive a piece of the secret, known as
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a share, in such a way that only qualified subsets of the participants can have
access to the secret by pooling the shares of their members.
The first construction of an SSS was done by Shamir [16] and Blakley [2]
independently in 1979. Shamir used polynomial interpolation for constructing
an SSS, while Blakley used hyperplane geometry. Later Shamir’s SSS turned
out to be equivalent to an SSS based on a Reed-Solomon code [15]. Some
of SSSs were applied to various fields such as cloud computing, controlling
nuclear weapons in military, recovering information from multiple servers, and
controlling access in banking system.
Since an SSS plays an important role in protecting secret information, it
has been studied by several authors (see [5], [7], [12], and [14]). In particular,
Massey [14] used linear codes for secret sharing and pointed out the relation-
ship between the access structure and the minimal codewords of the dual code
of the underlying code in 1993. However there has been less attention to SSSs
based on additive codes. Since additive codes include linear codes, we raise an
intriguing question whether SSSs based on additive codes have more advantage
than SSSs based on linear codes.
Ding et al. [5] remark the following. Normally the weight distribution of
a code is very hard to determine and that of only a few classes of codes is
known. As an SSS can be constructed from any error-correcting linear code,
what matters is how we are going to determine the access structure. The
access structure of SSSs based on error-correcting codes depends on the weight
distribution of their dual codes. To determine the access structure for the SSSs
we need more information than the weight distribution. This makes it difficult
to determine the access structure of SSSs based on codes, as determining the
weight distribution of codes is difficult.
In this paper we introduce SSSs based on linear codes with an example in
Section 2. In Section 3.2, we define SSSs based on additive codes and show that
they require two steps of calculations, while the SSSs based on linear codes
require only one step of calculation. In Section 3.3, we define minimal access
structures of SSSs based on additive codes over GF(4), which is developed from
Proposition 2 in [6]. We also describe SSSs based on a hexacode, a dodecacode
overGF (4) which is described and analyzed in [11], and S18. We determine the
access structure of the SSSs and prove their properties. The access structure for
these SSSs is more abundant than that of the SSSs based on linear codes. We
are able to determine the access structure of these SSSs because the structure
of the underlying additive codes is thoroughly understood.
2 Some preliminaries
Let GF (q) be a finite field with q = pr elements, where p is a prime and r is a
positive integer. The Hamming distance between two vectors x,y ∈ GF (q)n
is defined to be the number of coordinates in which x and y differ. Note that
the minimum distance d of a code C is the smallest nonzero distance between
two distinct codewords and is important in determining the error-correcting
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capability of C; the higher the minimum distance, the more errors the code
can correct. In general, it can detect up to d−1 errors and correct up to ⌊d−12 ⌋
errors.
The Hamming weight of a vector c in GF (q)n denoted by wt(c) is the
total number of nonzero coordinates. Let Ai, also denoted by Ai(C), be the
number of codewords of weight i in C. The list of Ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ n is called the
weight distribution of C. An [n, k, d] code C is a linear subspace of GF (q)n
with dimension k and minimum nonzero Hamming weight d. A generator ma-
trix G for an [n, k, d] code C is any k × n matrix G whose rows form a basis
for C.
We refer to [17]. Let G = (g0,g1, · · · ,gn−1) be a generator matrix of an
[n, k, d] code. We assume that none of gi’s is the zero vector. Let gi (1 ≤
i ≤ n − 1) be a column vector. In an SSS constructed from an [n, k, d] linear
code C, the secret is an element of GF (q) and there are n − 1 participants
P1, P2, · · · , Pn−1 and a dealer P0. To compute the shares with respect to the
secret s, the dealer randomly takes an element u=(u0, u1, · · · , uk−1) ∈ GF (q)k
such that s = ug0. The dealer treats u as an information vector and computes
the corresponding codeword
t = (t0, t1, · · · , tn−1)=uG
and the dealer gives the share ti to participant Pi as share for each i ≥ 1.
Since t0 = ug0 = s, a set of shares {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , tim} determines the secret s
if and only if the column g0 of the generating matrix G is a linear combination
of the columns {gi1 , gi2 , · · · , gim} of G.
Lemma 1 ([17]) Let C be an [n, k, d] linear code over the finite field GF (q)
and let C⊥ be its dual code. In the secret sharing scheme based on C, a subset
of shares {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , tim}, 1 ≤ i1 ≤ · · · ≤ im ≤ n − 1, determines the secret
if and only if there is a codeword
(1, 0, · · · , 0, ci1 , 0, · · · , 0, cim , 0, · · · , 0) (1)
in C⊥ with cij 6= 0 for at least one j.
We explain how the secret is recovered using (1). If there is a codeword of
(1) in C⊥, then the vector g0 is a linear combination of gi1 , . . . ,gim , i.e.,
g0 =
m∑
j=1
xjgij ,
where xj ∈ GF (q) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Then the secret s is recovered by computing
s =
m∑
j=1
xjtij .
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Here we think about a case of some malicious behaviors lying among par-
ticipants, called cheaters. They modify their shares in order to cheat. In this
case, we make use of detection of errors up to d − 1 and correction of errors
up to ⌊d−12 ⌋. The errors being considered as modified shares, SSSs based on
error-correcting codes are able to detect up to d − 1 cheaters and correct up
to ⌊d−12 ⌋ cheaters.
If a group of participants can recover the secret by pooling their shares,
then any group of participants containing this group can also recover the secret.
Definition 1 An access group is a subset of a set of participants that can
recover the secret from its shares. A collection Γ of access groups of partici-
pants is called an access structure of the scheme. An element A ∈ Γ is called
a minimal access group if no element of Γ is a proper subset of A. Hence a
set is a minimal access group if it can recover the secret but no proper subset
can recover the secret. We let Γ¯ = {A|A is a minimal access group }. We call
Γ¯ the minimal access structure.
In general, determining the minimal access structure is a difficult problem [5].
Definition 2 The support of a vector c = (c0, · · · , cn−1) ∈ GF (q)
n is defined
by
supp(c) = {0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 | ci 6= 0}.
Let c1 and c2 be two codewords of a code C. We say that c1 covers c2 if
supp(c2) ⊆ supp(c1).
If a nonzero codeword c covers only its scalar multiples, but no other
codewords, then it is called a minimal codeword.
Theorem 1 [6] Let C be an [n, k; q] code, and let G = (g0,g1, · · · ,gn−1) be
its generator matrix, where all gi’s are nonzero. If each nonzero codeword of C
is minimal, then in the secret sharing scheme based on C⊥, there are altogether
qk−1 minimal access groups. In addition, we have the following:
• If gi is a scalar multiple of g0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, then participant Pi must
be in every minimal access set. Such a participant is called a dictatorial
participant.
• If gi is not a scalar multiple of g0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, then participant Pi must
be in (q − 1)qk−2 out of qk−1 minimal access groups.
Definition 3 A t-(v, k, λ) design or briefly a t-design, is a pair (P ,B) where
P is a set of v elements, called points, and B is a collection of distinct subsets of
P of size k, called blocks, such that every subset of points of size t is contained
in precisely λ blocks.
For linear codes with a special weight distribution, a powerful result of the
Assmus-Mattson theorem guarantees that a set of codewords with a fixed
weight holds a t-design [1]. The Assmus-Mattson Theorem has been the main
tool in discovering designs in codes.
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Theorem 2 (Assmus-Mattson [10]) Let C be an [n, k, d] code over GF (q).
Suppose C⊥ has minimum weight d⊥. Let w be the largest integer with w ≤ n
satisfying
w − ⌊
w + q − 2
q − 1
⌋ < d.
(So w = n when q = 2.) Define w⊥ analogously using d⊥. Suppose that Ai =
Ai(C) and A
⊥
i = Ai(C
⊥), for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, are the weight distributions of C and
C⊥, respectively. Fix a positive integer t with t < d, and let s be the number
of i with A⊥i 6= 0 for 0 < i ≤ n− t. Suppose s ≤ d− t. Then:
(i) the vectors of weight i in C hold a t-design provided Ai 6= 0 and d ≤ i ≤ w,
and
(ii) the vectors of weight i in C⊥ hold a t-design provided A⊥i 6= 0 and d
⊥ ≤ i ≤
min{n− t, w⊥}.
A t-(v, k, λ) design is also an i-(v, k, λi) design for 0 ≤ i ≤ t. We can get
λi by the formula [10]:
λi = λ
(
v − i
t− i
)
/
(
k − i
t− i
)
. (2)
Let WC =
∑
Aiy
i. Let Di denote the 1-design formed from the vectors of
weight i, and λs(Di) denote λs for that particular design. Here λs denotes the
number of blocks that are incident with a given s-tuple of points for s ≤ t.
Corollary 1 ([7]) The access groups in the secret sharing scheme based on a
binary self-dual code C have the following size distribution generating function
when groups of each size form a 1-design :∑
i
λ1(Di)y
i−1. (3)
Now let us consider the accessibility of an access structure. Let P =
{P1, . . . , Pm} be a set of m participants and let AP be the set of all access
structures on P .
Definition 4 ([3]) The accessibility index on P is the map δP : AP −→ R
given by
δP (Γ ) =
|Γ |
2m
for Γ ∈ AP
where m = |P |. The number δP (Γ ) will be called the accessibility degree of
structure Γ .
δP (Γ ) may be interpreted as the probability of a random coalition in P to
be authorized when each participant has a probability 1/2 to belong to it. As
it is obvious, δP (Γ ) = 0 iff Γ = ∅. Otherwise, 0 < δP (Γ ) < 1, and |Γ | < |Γ ′|
implies δP (Γ ) < δP (Γ
′).
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Since supports of each weight in a code holding a 1-design determine the
size of the access structure Γ , the accessibility degree of Γ for the SSS based
on the code can be defined as follows :
δP (Γ ) =
1
2m
∑
i
λ1(Di).
Remark 1 The Gleason-Pierce-Ward Theorem [10] provides the main motiva-
tion for studying self-dual codes over GF (2), GF (3), and GF (4) since these
codes have the property that they are divisible. When a code C is divisible
by c > 1, it implies that all codewords have weights divisible by an integer c,
which is called a divisor of C.
Example 1 Here we introduce an SSS from [24, 12, 8] Golay code as given in
[7]. The weight enumerator of the length 24 Golay code is:
1 + 759y8 + 2576y12 + 759y16 + y24. (4)
Note that the supports of any nonzero weight of the [24, 12, 8] Golay code
form a 5-design. It is easy to calculate for λ1(D8) = 253, λ1(D12) = 1288, and
λ1(D16) = 506. These groups together with the entire group, comprise the
2048 elements of the access structure. Each of the 253 groups of size 8 must be
in the minimal access structure. Additionally, each of the 1288 groups of size
12 must be in the minimal access structure because if the support of a weight
8 vector were a subset of the support of a weight 12 vector then the sum of
these vectors would have weight 4, which is a contradiction. The group of size
24 is not in the minimal access structure. We note that no weight 16 vector
can have a support containing the support of weight 12 vector since it would
produce a weight 4 vector in the code, which is a contradiction. There are 253
weight 16 vectors whose support cannot be in the minimal access structure
and 253 that are in the minimal access structure. This gives the following.
Theorem 3 ([7]) In the secret sharing scheme produced from the extended
Golay code we have the following :
• The access structure consists of 253 groups of size 7, 1288 groups of size
11, 506 groups of size 15 and 1 group of size 23.
• The minimal access structure consists of the 253 groups of size 7, the 1288
groups of size 11, and 253 groups of size 15.
• No group of size less than 7 can determine the secret.
3 SSSs based on additive codes over GF (4)
3.1 Introduction to additive codes over GF (4)
An additive code C over GF (4) of length n is an additive subgroup of GF (4)n
(see [11] for details). Since C is a vector space over GF (2), it has a basis
consisting of k (0 ≤ k ≤ 2n) vectors whose entries are in GF (4). We call C
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an (n, 2k) code. A generator matrix of C is a k × n matrix with entries in
GF (4) whose rows are a basis of C. The weight of c, denoted as wt(c), in C
is the number of nonzero components of c. The minimum weight d of C is
the smallest weight of any nonzero codeword in C. If C is an (n, 2k) additive
code of minimum weight d, C is called an (n, 2k, d) code. In order to define an
inner product on additive codes we define the trace map, i.e., for x in GF (4),
Tr(x) = x+x2 ∈ GF (2). We now define the trace inner product of two vectors
x = (x1x2 · · ·xn) and y = (y1y2 · · · yn) in GF (4)n to be
x ⋆ y =
n∑
i=1
Tr(xiyi) ∈ GF (2),
where yi denotes the conjugate of yi. Note that Tr(xiyi) = 1 if and only if xi
and yi are nonzero distinct elements in GF (4).
If C is an additive code, its dual, denoted by C⊥, is the additive code
{x ∈ GF (4)n | x ⋆ c = 0 for all c ∈ C}. If C is an (n, 2k) code, then C⊥ is an
(n, 22n−k) code. As usual, C is called self-dual if C = C⊥. We note that if C is
self-dual, C is an (n, 2n) code.
3.2 SSSs based on additive codes over GF (4)
Let G = (g0,g1, · · · ,gn−1) be a generator matrix of an (n, 2k) code over
GF (4), where gi denotes the generic column of G. We assume that none of
gi’s is the zero vector. In an SSS constructed from an (n, 2
k) code C, the
secret is an element of GF (4), and n− 1 participants P1, P2, · · · , Pn−1 and a
dealer P0 are involved. To compute the shares with respect to the secret s, the
dealer randomly takes an element u=(u0, u1, · · · , uk−1) ∈ GF (2)k such that
s = ug0. There are altogether 2
k−2 vectors u ∈ GF (2)k if s is in GF (4), or
2k−1 if s an element in {0, 1}, {0, ω}, or {0, ω}. The dealer then treats u as
an information vector and computes the corresponding codeword
t = (t0, t1, · · · , tn−1)=uG
and the dealer gives the share ti to participant Pi as share for each i ≥ 1.
Lemma 2 Let C be an (n, 2k) code over GF (4) and C⊥ its dual code defined
by the trace inner product. Let
H1 =
{
x|x = (1, · · · , 0, xi1 , 0, · · · , 0, xim , 0, · · · , 0) ∈ C
⊥
with x0 = 1, xij 6= 0 for at least one j
}
,
H2 =
{
y|y = (ω, · · · , 0, yi1 , 0, · · · , 0, yil , 0, · · · , 0) ∈ C
⊥
with y0 = ω, yij 6= 0 for at least one j
}
,
H3 =
{
z|z = (ω, · · · , 0, zi1 , 0, · · · , 0, zir , 0, · · · , 0) ∈ C
⊥
with z0 = ω, zij 6= 0 for at least one j
}
.
(5)
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In the secret sharing scheme based on C, two subsets of shares {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , tim}
and {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , til}, for 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < im ≤ n − 1 and 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < il ≤
n− 1, determine the secret if and only if there are at least two codewords from
distinct sets among Hi’s, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Proof (⇐) Suppose there are at least two codewords in C⊥ as in (5). Then we
get two of the three equations from trace inner product as follows:
(t0 + t
2
0) + (ti1 x¯1 + (ti1 x¯1)
2) + . . .+ (tim x¯m + (tim x¯m)
2) = 0,
(t0ω + (t0ω)
2) + (ti1 y¯1 + (ti1 y¯1)
2) + . . .+ (til y¯l + (til y¯l)
2) = 0,
(t0ω + (t0ω)
2) + (ti1 z¯1 + (ti1 z¯1)
2) + . . .+ (tir z¯r + (tir z¯r)
2) = 0.
(6)
Since s = ug0 = t0, the equation can be rewritten as
s+ s2 =
m∑
j=1
(tij x¯j + (tij x¯j)
2) ∈ GF (2),
sω + (sω)2 =
l∑
j=1
(tij x¯j + (tij x¯j)
2) ∈ GF (2),
sω + (sω)2 =
l∑
j=1
(tij x¯j + (tij x¯j)
2) ∈ GF (2).
Let α1 = s + s
2, α2 = sω + (sω)
2, and α3 = sω + (sω)
2. Now the secret
s can be recovered using two values of αi’s based on Table 1. For example, if
α1 = 0 and α2 = 1, then the secret s is uniquely determined as 1.
As we can see in Table 1, we do not need all the three values of αi’s since
two values of αi’s are sufficient to determine the secret s. Now we can say we
recover the secret s with two values of αi’s, where i = 1, 2, or 3.
Table 1 Recovering the secret s from αi’s
α1 = s+ s2 α2 = sω + (sω)2 α3 = sω + (sω)2 s
0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 ω
1 1 0 ω
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(⇒) Suppose there are two subsets of shares {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , tim} and {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , til},
for 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < im ≤ n− 1 and 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < il ≤ n− 1, that determine
the secret s.
First, we note the following:
(ugi)
2 = ((u0, u1, · · · , uk−1)(g0i, g1i, . . . , g(k−1),i)
T )2
= (u0g0i + u1g1i + . . .+ uk−1g(k−1),i)
2
= u20g
2
0i + u
2
1g
2
1i + . . .+ u
2
k−1g
2
(k−1),i
= (u20 + u
2
1 + . . .+ u
2
k−1)(g
2
0i + g
2
1i + . . .+ g
2
(k−1),i)
= (u20, u
2
1, . . . , u
2
k−1)(g
2
0i, g
2
1i, . . . , g
2
(k−1),i)
T
= (u0, u1, · · · , uk−1)(g
2
0i, g
2
1i, . . . , g
2
(k−1),i)
T
(7)
Here u = (u0, u1, · · · , uk−1) = (u20, u
2
1, . . . , u
2
k−1) since u ∈ GF (2)
k. Let-
ting g2i = (g
2
0i, g
2
1i, . . . , g
2
(k−1),i)
T for convenience, we have (ugi)
2 = ug2i .
Now we can rewrite αi’s in the following way :
α1 =
m∑
j=1
(
tij x¯j + (tij x¯j)
2
)
= u
m∑
j=1
(xjgij + x¯jg
2
ij
),
α2 =
l∑
j=1
(
tij y¯j + (tij y¯j)
2
)
= u
l∑
j=1
(xjgij + x¯jg
2
ij
),
α3 =
r∑
j=1
(
tij z¯j + (tij z¯j)
2
)
= u
r∑
j=1
(xjgij + x¯jg
2
ij
).
We can determine two of the values of αi’s, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 by the two sets of
shares, {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , tim} and {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , til}, for 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < im ≤ n− 1,
1 ≤ i1 < · · · < il ≤ n− 1, if and only if
g0 + g
2
0 =
m∑
j=1
(xjgij + x¯jg
2
ij
), ω¯g0 + ωg
2
0 =
l∑
j=1
(xjgij + x¯jg
2
ij
),
ωg0 + ω¯g
2
0 =
r∑
j=1
(xjgij + x¯jg
2
ij
).
(8)
We can find xj ’s by solving the linear equations and get two values of αi’s.
Using these two values of αi’s we can recover the secret s by Table 1. Hence
there exist at least two codewords from distinct sets among Hi’s, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3
if we recover the secret s using two subsets of shares, {ti1 , ti2 , · · · , tim} and
{ti1 , ti2 , · · · , til}. ⊓⊔
Now we need to define an access group and an access structure for SSS
based on additive codes over GF (4).
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Let
ΓH1 = {the set of supports for x ∈ H1 excluding 1 from each support},
ΓH2 = {the set of supports for y ∈ H2 excluding 1 from each support},
ΓH3 = {the set of supports for z ∈ H3 excluding 1 from each support}.
The access structure for a linear code based SSS is a set of supports of vectors
in C⊥ with c0 = 1, which is same to ΓH1 . The access structures from additive
codes over GF (4) are different from those from linear codes. To recover the
secret s, we need at least two sets among ΓH1 , ΓH2 , or ΓH3 for an access
structure. We obtain the values of αi and αj from two elements of ΓHi and
ΓHj , i 6= j, respectively. With the two values, we can recover the secret s using
the table above.
Since this process requires at least two steps of calculations to reveal the
secret, we call this process as a 2-step SSS. On the other hand, the previous
SSS can be regarded as a 1-step SSS.
We need the Assmus-Mattson Theorem for additive codes over GF (4)
which gives designs with possibly repeated blocks to define our process.
Theorem 4 ([11]) Let C be an additive (n, 2k) code over GF (4) with minimum
weight d. Let C⊥ be its dual (n, 22n−k) code with minimum weight d′. Let
0 < t < d. Let s be the number of weights Bi 6= 0 in C
⊥ where 0 < i ≤ n− t.
Suppose that s ≤ d− t. Then the following hold.
(i) For each weight u (d ≤ u ≤ n), the set of supports of codewords of weight
u in C holds a t-design with possibly repeated blocks.
(ii) The set of supports of vectors of weight w in C⊥ where Bw 6= 0 and d′ ≤
w ≤ n− t hold a t-design with possibly repeated blocks.
(iii) The supports of minimum weight vectors are either simple blocks or have
repetition number 3.
Corollary 2 ([11]) Let ni := 6m+2(i−1) with m ≥ 1 any integer and i = 1, 2,
or 3. Let C be an extremal additive even self-dual (ni, 2ni) code over GF (4)
with minimum weight d = 2m+ 2 ≥ 6. Then the vectors of each weight w in
C where Aw 6= 0 and d ≤ w ≤ ni hold a (7− 2i)-design with possibly repeated
blocks.
Lemma 3 Let C be an additive even (n, 2k) self-dual code over GF (4). Then
the supports of codewords for all non-trivial weights hold a 1-design with pos-
sible repeated blocks if d ≥ n+23 .
Proof An additive (n, 2k) self-dual code over GF (4) has n2 − 1 possible non-
trivial weights. Then d2 − 1 of these possible weights have no vectors since d is
the minimum weight. Since d ≥ n+23 , from this we get the following inequality
which satisfies Assmus-Mattson Theorem:
d− 1 ≥ (
n
2
− 1)− (
d
2
− 1).
Thus the supports of codewords for all non-trivial weights hold a 1-design
with possibly repeated blocks.
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3.3 SSSs based on extremal additive even self-dual codes over GF (4)
Up to now we have introduced a different method of defining access structures
based on additive codes. We have shown that the access structures are nicely
constructed in this way. However there might be some repeated blocks in these
access structures. We, hence, employ the notion of a generalized t-design from
[4] to resolve this issue.
The generalized t-design is to count the number of groups in an access
structure for an additive code based SSS. We will, first of all, redefine covering
an element for the generalized t-design [4].
Definition 5 Let G = GF (4), the set of n-tuples of GF (4). An element a of
G is said to be componentwisely covered (abbr. c-covered) by an element b of
G if each nonzero component ai of a is equal to the corresponding component
bi of b; we denote this by a ≤ b. For example, a = (1, 1, ω, 0) is c-covered by
b = (1, 1, ω, ω).
Definition 6 A subset S of G is called a generalized t-design of type q− 1,
with parameters t-(n, k, µt), 0 ≤ t ≤ k ≤ n, µt ≥ 1, if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(i) all elements of S have the same weight k,
(ii) each element of weight t in G is c-covered by a constant number µt of
elements of S. If a subset S of G holds a generalized t-design of type q− 1,
then it holds a generalized (t− 1)-design of type q − 1.
In the binary case (q = 2), this is the same as a classical t-design without
repeated blocks.
For a given code C of length n and for an element e of G = GF (4)n, we
denote by µ(p, e) the number of codewords of weight p that c-cover e and
µi(p, e) the number of codewords of weight p in ΓHi that c-cover e. Trivially,
if p < wt(e), then µ(p, e) = 0 and µi(p, e) = 0 .
Delsarte’s theorem for any finite alphabet is given as follows.
Theorem 5 ([4]) Let C be a q−ary code of dual distance d′. Let t be an integer,
1 ≤ t ≤ d′, such that the number of weights of C that are at least equal to t is
at most equal to d′ − t. Then each set of codewords of a given weight ≥ t is a
generalized t−design of type q − 1.
Now we obtain generalized t−designs from additive codes over GF (4).
Corollary 3 ([8]) Let C be an extremal even additive self-dual code over GF (4)
of length n = 6m (respectively, n = 6m + 2). Then the set of codewords
of weight w in C with Aw 6= 0 forms a generalized 2−design (respectively,
1−design) of type 3.
Since two elements from two different sets among ΓHi ’s, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are
sufficient to recover a secret, we are going to consider all the combinations of
only two distinct ΓHi ’s when defining access structures. That is, all the pairs
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(si, sj) for si ∈ ΓHi and sj ∈ ΓHj with i 6= j, comprise all the elements of the
access structure. An element (si, sj) ∈ Γ is called a minimal access group if
neither si nor sj c-covers any other elements in ΓHi and ΓHj , respectively.
We let Γ¯ = {(si, sj)|(si, sj) is a minimal access group} and call it by the
minimal access structure.
Theorem 6 The access structure of this secret sharing scheme is given by
Γ = {(x, y)|x ∈ ΓHi and y ∈ ΓHj , where i 6= j and i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}}. (9)
The number of parties in the scheme is n− 1 and the access structure has the
following properties:
• Any group of size less than d− 1 cannot be used to recover the secret.
• There are µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1) pairs of groups of size (p−1, q−1) in ΓHi×ΓHj ,
i 6= j, that can recover the secret, where e1 is any vector of weight 1 in
GF (4)n .
• When the parties come together, up to ⌊d−12 ⌋ cheaters can be found in each
group.
• Γ is a minimal access structure if for every element (x, y) in Γ , no element
of ΓHi and ΓHj are subsets of x and y, respectively.
Proof The first property is trivial from the definition of ΓHi ’s. The minimum
size of any group in ΓHi is greater or equal to d − 1. Thus any group of size
less than d − 1 cannot be used to recover the secret. We can get the second
property from the proof of Lemma 2. Since any element in ΓHi × ΓHj , i 6= j,
can recover the secret s, there are µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1) pairs of groups of size
(p− 1, q − 1) that can recover the secret. The third property comes from the
error-correcting capability of additive codes over GF(4). The fourth property
is from the definition of the minimal access structure. ⊓⊔
Corollary 4 The pairs of groups from ΓHi × ΓHj , i 6= j, in this SSS based
on an additive self-dual code C have the following size distribution generating
function : ∑
p
∑
q
µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1)y
(p−1,q−1), (10)
where p and q denote the weights of codewords.
Furthermore, the size distribution generating function for the access struc-
ture is as follows:
∑
i6=j
∑
p
∑
q
µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1)y
(p−1,q−1). (11)
Proof Since |ΓHi | =
∑
p µi(p, e1), |ΓHi × ΓHj | =
∑
p
∑
q µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1) for
i 6= j. From this we get the size distribution generating function of ΓHi ×
ΓHj . Since | ∪i6=j ΓHi × ΓHj | =
∑
i6=j
∑
p
∑
q µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1), we get the size
distribution generating function for the access structure as (11). ⊓⊔
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Note that we redefined minimal access group of SSSs from additive codes
over GF (4) considering its distinct way of recovering the secret s. Thus we
can now develop Theorem 1 for SSSs based on additive codes over GF (4).
Theorem 7 Let C be an (n, 2k) code over GF (4), and let G = (g0,g1, · · · ,gn−1)
be its generator matrix. If each nonzero codeword of C is a minimal vector,
then in the secret sharing scheme based on C⊥, there are altogether 3 · 22k−4
minimal access groups if the secret s ∈ GF (4). In addition, we have the fol-
lowing:
• If gi is the same vector to g0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, then participant Pi must be in
every ΓHk , 1 ≤ k ≤ 3. Such a participant is called a dictatorial participant
in SSS based on GF(4).
• If gi is not same to g0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, then participant Pi must be in
33 · 22k−8 out of 3 · 22k−4 minimal access groups.
Proof At the beginning of this section, we assumed that none of gi’s is the zero
vector. Hence g0 6= 0. Thus ug0 takes on each element of GF (4) exactly 2
k−2
times when u ranges over all elements of GF (2)k. Hence there are 2k − 2k−2
codewords in C with an nonzero component in its first coordinate. Since each
nonzero codeword is a minimal vector, a codeword c-covers another one if and
only if they are the same vector. Hence the total number of minimal codewords
is 2k − 2k−2 = 3 · 2k−2.
Since
|ΓH1 = {c|c0 = ug0 = 1, c ∈ C}| = |ΓH2 = {c|c0 = ug0 = ω, c ∈ C}|
= |ΓH3 = {c|c0 = ug0 = ω, c ∈ C}| =
3 · 2k−2
3
= 2k−2,
the number of minimal access groups is∑
i6=j
|ΓHi × ΓHj | = 3× 2
k−2 × 2k−2 = 3 · 22k−4.
If gi = g0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, then ug0 = a 6= 0 implies ugi = a. Thus the
participant Pi is involved in every ΓHk , 1 ≤ k ≤ 3. If g0 and g1 are linearly
independent, then (ug0,ugi) takes on each element of GF (4)
2 exactly 32 ·2k−4
when the vector u ranges over GF (4)k. Hence
|{u|ug0 6= 0, and ugi 6= 0}| = 3
2 · 2k−4
and
|{u|ug0 = 1, and ugi 6= 0}| = |{u|ug0 = ω, and ugi 6= 0}|
= |{u|ug0 = ω, and ugi 6= 0}| = 3 · 2
k−4.
Thus the number of minimal groups in which Pi is involved is
3× 3 · 2k−4 × 3 · 2k−4 = 33 · 22k−8.
⊓⊔
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The accessibility degree for SSSs based on additive codes can be defined
as the follows.
Definition 7 The accessibility index on P is the map δP : AP −→ R given
by
δP (Γ ) =
|Γ |
22m
for Γ ∈ AP
where m = |P |, the number of participants. The number δP (Γ ) will be called
the accessibility degree of structure Γ .
Here we have to divide |Γ | by 22m since this is 2-step SSS and we have to pool
the participants’ shares twice.
Let Γ be the access structure above. Then we can determine the accessibil-
ity degree of access structure Γ for SSS based on an additive code over GF (4)
by
δP (Γ ) =
1
22n−2
∑
i6=j
∑
p
∑
q
µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1).
Example 2 We will describe SSS using the (6, 26) hexacode. Let G6 be a linear
[6, 3, 4] hexacode over GF (4) whose generator matrix is as follows :[
1 0 0 1 ω ω
0 1 0 ω 1 ω
0 0 1 ω ω 1
]
.
The weight enumerator of the hexacode G6 is :
1 + 45y4 + 18y6.
The vectors of weight 4 in G6 hold a 2-design by Theorem 2 and the vectors of
weight 6 hold 1-design by Lemma 3.2 in [7]. Note that 45 = λ2
(
6
2
)
/
(
4
2
)
, whence
λ2 = 18. Thus λ1 = 18
(
5
1
)
/
(
3
1
)
= 30. It is easy to see that there are 10 supports
of blocks in ΓH1 , considering scalar multiplication. That is, these numbers can
be obtained by dividing λ for the 1-design held by these vectors by 3. The
following is the size distribution of the access structure of the hexacode G6.∑
i∈{4,6}
λ1(Di)y
i−1 = 10y3 + 6y5. (12)
The accessibility degree of the access structure for the linear hexacode G6
is
δP (Γ ) =
|Γ |
2m
=
16
25
=
1
2
= 0.5.
Now let us think of G6 as an additive code. Then it has the following
generator matrix: 

1 0 0 1 ω ω
ω 0 0 ω ω ω
0 1 0 ω 1 ω
0 ω 0 ω ω ω
0 0 1 ω ω 1
0 0 ω ω ω ω

 .
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Note that there are two kinds of blocks for extremal additive even self-dual
codes : one is a simple block and the other is of multiplicity 3. By Theorem
4, it is easy to check that the supports of weight 4 vectors form a 2-design
with possibly repeated blocks and the supports of weights 4 and 6 vectors
form 1-designs by Lemma 3. Since the hexacode G6 is extremal even additive
self-dual, the weight 4 and 6 codewords hold generalized 2-designs of type 3
by Corollary 3. These codewords eventually hold generalized 1-designs of type
3 by the definition of generalized t-designs. It implies that there are same
number of blocks in each ΓHi . For example, when λ1(D4) = 10, µi(4, e1) = 10.
Similarly, µi(6, e1) = 6 when λ1(D6) = 6. The supports of the vectors are
described in Table 1.
Table 2 The supports of each weight for the hexacode G6
ΓH1(x0 = 1) ΓH2(y0 = ω) ΓH3(z0 = ω)
wt4
{2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4}
{2, 3, 5} {2, 3, 5} {2, 3, 5}
{2, 3, 6} {2, 3, 6} {2, 3, 6}
{2, 4, 5} {2, 4, 5} {2, 4, 5}
{2, 4, 6} {2, 4, 6} {2, 4, 6}
{2, 5, 6} {2, 5, 6} {2, 5, 6}
{3, 4, 5} {3, 4, 5} {3, 4, 5}
{3, 4, 6} {3, 4, 6} {3, 4, 6}
{3, 5, 6} {3, 5, 6} {3, 5, 6}
{4, 5, 6} {4, 5, 6} {4, 5, 6}
# of wt 4 10 10 10
wt 6 {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
# of wt 6 6 6 6
Total # 16 16 16
The size distribution of the access structure of the hexacode G6 by Corollary
4 is ∑
i6=j
1≤i,j≤3
∑
p∈{4,6}
∑
q∈{4,6}
µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1)y
(p−1,q−1)
= 100y(3,3) + 60y(3,5) + 60y(5,3) + 36y(5,5).
(13)
These pairs of groups comprise the 256 elements of the access structure. Ad-
ditionally, a group of size 6 do not c-cover any group of size 4 . If a weight
4 vector were c-covered by a weight 6 vector, then the sum of the two vec-
tors will yield a weight 2 vector, which is a contradiction. Thus 256 pairs of
supports form the minimal access structure. Note that ΓH1 in Table 1 is the
access structure for linear hexacode G6.
We summarize the following properties of SSS using the hexacode.
Summary :
We summarize the following properties of SSS using the hexacode.
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(i) The access structure consists of 100 pairs of sets of size (3,3), 60 pairs of
groups of size (3,5), 60 pairs of groups of size (5,3), 36 pairs of groups of
size (5,5).
(ii) All the pairs of groups constitute the minimal access structure.
(iii) No group of size less than 3 can be used in recovering the secret.
Moreover, the accessibility degree for the access structure of the additive
hexacode G6 is
δP(Γ ) =
1
22m
∑
i6=j
∑
p
∑
q
µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1) =
256
210
=
1
4
= 0.25.
Example 3 Let us consider a self-dual [12,6,4] codeE12 with a generator matrix
[13] 

1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0

 .
The weight enumerator of E12 is :
1 + 45y4 + 216y6 + 1755y8 + 1800y10 + 279y12. (14)
Since we cannot apply Theorem 2 to E12, we have to get the access structure
by MAGMA, which is one of the commonly used computer languages. Using
this, we obtain the following size distribution of access structure for E12 :
5y3 + 36y5 + 390y7 + 500y9 + 93y11. (15)
The accessibility degree of the access structure for the SSS based on E12 is
δP(Γ ) =
|Γ |
2m
=
1024
211
=
1
2
= 0.5.
Now we will describe an SSS based on an extremal additive even self-dual
(12, 212) dodecacode QC 12 (see [8], [9], [11]). It has the following generator
matrix 

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 ω ω ω ω ω ω
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
ω ω ω ω ω ω 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 ω ω 0 0 0 1 ω ω
0 0 0 ω ω 1 0 0 0 ω ω 1
1 ω ω 0 0 0 1 ω ω 0 0 0
ω 1 ω 0 0 0 ω 1 ω 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 ω ω ω ω 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 ω 1 ω 1 ω ω 0 0 0
1 ω ω 0 0 0 0 0 0 ω ω 1
ω 1 ω 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ω ω


.
The weight enumerator of QC 12 is :
1 + 396y6 + 1485y8 + 1980y10 + 234y12.
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By Corollary 2, the supports of weight 6 vectors forms a 5-design with
possibly repeated blocks. We remark that there are 18 codewords of weight
6 whose supports repeat three times. Among them, exactly 12 codewords are
such that their scalar multiples are also codewords. Since A6 = 396, there are
396-18=378 codewords of weight 6 whose supports are simple blocks. Note
that 396 = λ5
(
12
5
)
/
(
6
5
)
, whence λ5 = 3. Allowing repeated blocks we obtain
a 5-(12, 6, λ5 = 3) design in QC 12. Each 5-set is either contained in one
block repeated three times or in three distinct blocks. We see that vectors of
other weights 8, 10, and 12 hold 5-designs with possibly repeated blocks with
λ5 = 105, 630 and 234, respectively [11].
Since QC 12 is extremal even additive self-dual, the codewords of all the
nonzero weights hold generalized 2-designs of type 3 by Corollary 3 and also
hold generalized 1-designs of type 3 by the definition of generalized t-designs.
Thus we have the following numbers µi(p, e1) by dividing λ1 by 3. When λ5 = 3
for weight 6 codewords, λ1 = 3
(
11
4
)
/
(
5
4
)
= 198. It implies that µ1(6, e1) =
µ2(6, e1) = µ3(6, e1) = 66. Repeating the calculation for weight 8 with λ5 =
105, we get λ1 = 105
(
11
4
)
/
(
7
4
)
= 990. Thus µ1(8, e1) = µ2(8, e1) = µ3(8, e1) =
330. For weight 10 with λ5 = 630, λ1 = 630
(
11
4
)
/
(
9
4
)
= 1650. Thus µi(10, e1) =
550. For weight 12 with λ5 = 234, λ1 = 234
(
11
4
)
/
(
11
4
)
= 234. Thus µi(12, e1) =
78.
By Corollary 4, the size distribution of the access structure for the dode-
cacode QC 12 is∑
i6=j
1≤i,j≤3
∑
p∈{6,8,10,12}
∑
q∈{6,8,10,12}
µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1)y
(p−1,q−1)
= 4356y(5,5) + 21780y(5,7) + 36300y(5,9) + 5148y(5,11) + 21780y(7,5)
+ 108900y(7,7) + 181500y(7,9) + 25740y(7,11) + 36300y(9,5) + 181500y(9,7)
+ 302500y(9,9) + 42900y(9,11) + 5148y(11,5) + 25740y(11,7) + 42900y(11,9)
+ 6084y(11,11).
(16)
A vector of weight 8 does not c-cover any vector of weight 6. If a weight
6 vector were c-covered by a weight 8 vector, then the sum of the two vectors
will yield a weight 2 vector, which is a contradiction. Likewise, a vector of
weight 10 does not c-cover any vector of weight 6 or 8 . If a weight 6 or 8
vector were c-covered by a weight 10 vector, then the sum of the two vectors
will yield a weight 4, or 2 vector, respectively, which is a contradiction.
Summary :
We summarize the following properties of SSS using QC 12.
(i) The access structure consists of the pairs of groups as in (16).
(ii) All the pairs of groups with the sizes ∈ {5, 7, 9} are contained in the mini-
mal access structure.
(iii) No group of size less than 5 can be used in recovering the secret.
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The accessibility degree for the SSS based on the dodecacode QC 12 is
δP(Γ ) =
1
22m
∑
i6=j
∑
p
∑
q
µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1) =
1, 048, 576
222
=
1
4
= 0.25.
Example 4 Now we are going to describe an SSS based on S18 which is an
(18, 218) extremal additive even self-dual code. The weight enumerator of S18
is [13]:
1 + 2754y8 + 18360y10 + 77112y12 + 110160y14 + 50949y16 + 2808y18. (17)
Since all the non-zero weights in S18 hold 5-designs with possibly repeated
blocks by Corollary 2, we can easily calculate λ1 for each weight using (2).
Note that 2754 = λ5
(
18
5
)
/
(
8
5
)
, whence λ5 = 18. Allowing repeated blocks
we obtain a 5-(18, 8, λ5 = 18) design in S18. Each 5-set is either contained in
one block repeated three times or in three distinct blocks. We see that vectors
of other weights 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 hold 5-designs with possibly repeated
blocks with λ5 = 540, 7128, 25740, 25974, and 2808, respectively.
Since S18 is extremal even additive self-dual, the codewords of all the
nonzero weights hold generalized 2-designs of type 3 by Corollary 3 and also
hold generalized 1-designs of type 3 by the definition of generalized t-designs.
Thus we have the following numbers µi(p, e1) by dividing λ1 by 3. When λ5 =
18 for weight 8 codewords, λ1 = 18
(
17
4
)
/
(
7
4
)
= 1224. It implies that µ1(8, e1) =
µ2(8, e1) = µ3(8, e1) = 408. Repeating the calculation for weight 10 with
λ5 = 540, we get λ1 = 540
(
17
4
)
/
(
9
4
)
= 10200. Thus µ1(10, e1) = µ2(10, e1) =
µ3(10, e1) = 3400. For weight 12 with λ5 = 7128, λ1 = 7128
(
17
4
)
/
(
11
4
)
= 51408.
Thus µi(12, e1) = 17136. For weight 14 with λ5 = 25740, λ1 = 25740
(
17
4
)
/
(
13
4
)
=
85680. Thus µi(14, e1) = 28560. For weight 16 with λ5 = 25974,
λ1 = 25974
(
17
4
)
/
(
15
4
)
= 45288. Thus µi(16, e1) = 15096. For weight 18 with
λ5 = 2808, λ1 = 2808
(
17
4
)
/
(
17
4
)
= 2808. Thus µi(18, e1) = 936.
By Corollary 4, the size distribution of the access structure for S18 is
∑
i6=j
1≤i,j≤3
∑
p∈{8,10,12,14,16,18}
∑
q∈{8,10,12,14,16,18}
µi(p, e1)µj(q, e1)y
(p−1,q−1)
= 166464y(7,7) + 1387200y(7,9) + 6991488y(7,11) + 11652480y(7,13) + 6159168y(7,15)
+ 381888y(7,17) + 1387200y(9,7) + 11560000y(9,9) + 58262400y(9,11) + 97104000y(9,13)
+ 51326400y(9,15) + 3182400y(9,17) + 6991488y(11,7) + 58262400y(11,9)
+ 293642496y(11,11) + 489404160y(11,13) + 258685056y(11,15) + 16039296y(11,17)
+ 11652480y(13,7) + 97104000y(13,9) + 489404160y(13,11) + 815673600y(13,13)
+ 431141760y(13,15) + 26732160y(13,17) + 6159168y(15,7) + 51326400y(15,9)
+ 258685056y(15,11) + 431141760y(15,13) + 227889216y(15,15) + 14129856y(15,17)
+ 381888y(17,7) + 3182400y(17,9) + 16039296y(17,11) + 26732160y(17,13)
+ 14129856y(17,15) + 876096y(17,17) .
(18)
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A vector of weight 10 does not c-cover any vector of weight 8. If a weight 8
vector were c-covered by a weight 10 vector, then the sum of the two vectors
will yield a weight 2 vector, which is a contradiction. Likewise, a vector of
weight 12 does not c-cover any vector of weight 8 or 10 . If a weight 8 or 10
vector were c-covered by a weight 12 vector, then the sum of the two vectors
will yield a weight 4, or 2 vector, respectively, which is a contradiction. A
vector of weight 14 does not c-cover any vector of weight 8 ,10 or 12 . If a
weight 8, 10 or 12 vector were c-covered by a weight 14 vector, then the sum
of the two vectors will yield a weight 6, 4, or 2 vector, respectively, which is a
contradiction.
Summary :
We summarize the following properties of SSS using S18.
(i) The access structure consists of the pairs of groups as in (18).
(ii) All the pairs of groups with the sizes ∈ {7, 9, 11, 13} are contained in the
minimal access structure.
(iii) No group of size less than 7 can be used in recovering the secret.
The accessibility degree for the SSS based on S18 is
δP(Γ ) =
1
22m
∑
i6=j
∑
p
∑
q
µ(p, e1)µ(q, e1) =
4294967296
234
=
1
4
= 0.25.
The accessibility degree of the access structure for the SSS based on S18 is
1
4
which is same as that of the dodecacode QC 12.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce two contrasting access structures, one from linear
codes and the other from additive codes. The new results we obtained are
mainly stated in Section 3.2 and 3.3. In Section 3.2, we newly defined SSSs
based on additive codes over GF (4). The access structure from additive codes
over GF (4) is described in a distinct way requiring at least two steps of calcu-
lations. In Section 3.3, we determined the access structure for SSSs based on
a hexacode, a dodecacode over GF (4) and S18 using the notion we introduced
in Section 3.2.
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